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Abstract
The development of tractable forward looking models of mone-
tary policy has lead to an explosion of research on the implications of
adopting Taylor-type interest rate rules. Indeterminacies have been
found to arise for some speciﬁcations of the interest rate rule, raising
the possibility of increased economic ﬂuctuations due to a dependence
of expectations on extraneous “sunspots.” Separately, recent work by
a number of authors has shown that sunspot equilibria previously
thought to be unstable under private agent learning can in some cases
be stable when the observed sunspot has a suitable time series struc-
ture. In this paper we generalize the “common factor” technique, used
in this analysis, to examine standard monetary models that combine
forward looking expectations and predetermined variables. We con-
sider a variety of speciﬁcations that incorporate both lagged and ex-
pected inﬂation in the Phillips Curve, and both expected and inertial
elements in the policy rule. We ﬁnd that some policy rules can indeed
lead to learnable sunspot solutions and we investigate the conditions
under which this phenomenon arises.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E32, D83, D84.
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ity.
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1 Introduction
The development of tractable forward looking models of monetary policy,
together with the inﬂuential work of (Taylor 1993), has lead to an explosion
of research on the implications of adopting Taylor-type interest rate rules.
These rules take the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument and direct
the central bank to set this rate according to some simple (typically linear)
dependence on current, lagged, and/or expected inﬂation and output gap,
and possibly on an inertial term to encourage interest rate smoothing.
While these simple policy rules for many reasons are advantageous to
both researchers and policy makers, it has been noted by some authors,
e.g. (Bernanke and Woodford 1997), (Woodford 1999) and (Svensson and
Woodford 1999), that the corresponding models exhibit indeterminate steady-
states for large regions of the reasonable parameter space. This presence of
indeterminacy is thought undesirable because associated with each indeter-
minate steady-state is a continuum of sunspot equilibria, and the particular
equilibrium on which agents ultimately coordinate may not exhibit wanted
properties.
Though having their informal origins in Keynes’ notion of animal spirits,
analysis of sunspots has, in the past, been couched principally in the theoreti-
cal literature. However, applied macroeconomists began to take notice when,
in the mid nineties, (Farmer and Guo 1994) showed that calibrated real busi-
ness cycle models, modiﬁed to include externalities or other non-convexities,
exhibited sunspots; and furthermore, these sunspots could be used to ex-
plain ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies. This applied interest has
spread to the literature on monetary policy, and, in an empirical sense, has
culminated with the argument of (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) that the
volatile inﬂation and output of the seventies may have been due to sunspot
phenomena. In particular, they combine a standard forward-looking “New
Keynesian” IS-AS model1 with a simple estimated forward-looking Taylor
rule, using data from the 1960’s and 1970’s, and ﬁnd that the corresponding
steady-state is indeterminate; they conclude that the ﬂuctuations in output
gap and inﬂation may be well explained by agents coordinating on a volatile
sunspot equilibrium.
1
This model has also been called the “New Phillips Curve” or “optimizing IS-AS”
model, and is obtained as a linearization of an optimimizing equilibrium model with
“Calvo” pricing. For discussion, derivation and citations to the earlier literature, see
(Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), (Woodford 1999) and (Woodford 2003).
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The existence of sunspot equilibria raises the question of whether it is
plausible that agents will actually coordinate on them. One natural criterion
for this is that the sunspot equilibria should be stable under adaptive learn-
ing.2 Although it has been shown by (Woodford 1990) that stable sunspots
can exist in simple overlapping generations models,3 the sunspots in many
calibrated applied models are lacking this necessary stability. For example
(Evans and Honkapohja 2001) show that sunspots in the Farmer-Guo model
are unstable, and (Evans and McGough 2002a) describe a stability puzzle
surrounding the lack of stable indeterminacies in a host of non-convex RBC-
type models.4
The existence of indeterminacies in monetary models, together with the
instability of indeterminacies in RBC-type models, raises a natural question:
Are sunspot equilibria in the New Keynesian models stable under learning?
This speciﬁc question has been addressed by (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001),
who consider a purely forward looking AS equation (“ Phillips” curve) and
analyze a variety of interest rules including those dependent on current,
lagged, and expected inﬂation and output gap, and those also dependent
on an interest rate smoothing term. They ﬁnd that if the interest rate de-
pends only on expected inﬂation and expected output gap then there can
exist stable equilibria that depend on ﬁnite state sunspots; otherwise, the
sunspot equilibria they consider are not learnable.5
Independent of the monetary policy literature, work on multiple equilib-
ria and stability in macroeconomic models has continued, and recent research
has emphasized that stability under learning of sunspots can depend upon
the way in which a particular equilibrium is viewed, or represented. (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003c) found that ﬁnite state sunspots in a simple forward
looking model can be stable even though previous research had suggested
2
Eductive approaches could also be considered. See, for example, (Guesnerie 1992),
(Evans and Guesnerie 2003) and (Desgranges and Negroni 2001). Stability under eductive
learning appears to be somewhat more stringent than stability under adaptive learning.
3
For the local stability conditions see (Evans and Honkapohja 1994) and (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003b).
4
Other examples of stable sunspot equilibria include (Howitt andMcAfee 1992), (Evans,
Honkapohja, and Romer 1998), (Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001) and (Evans and
McGough 2003).
5
For these models stability under learning of “fundamental” (minimal state variable)
solutions has been studied by (Bullard and Mitra 2003), (Evans and Honkapohja 2003d)
and others. For a survey with references see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). An important
early instability result was obtained by (Howitt 1992).
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that no stable sunspots exist in these models. The apparent paradox is re-
solved as follows: all sunspot equilibria in these models can be represented as
a linear dependence on lagged endogenous variables and a sunspot variable
taking the form of a martingale diﬀerence sequence. These representations
are always unstable under learning. However, when the sunspot is a ﬁnite
state Markov process, the associated equilibrium is also ﬁnite state and thus
has an alternate representation depending solely on the sunspot. When rep-
resented in this manner, the associated learning dynamics indicate stability
for some (but not all) regions of the parameter space.
In (Evans and McGough 2003), we studied sunspot equilibria in a uni-
variate stochastic linear forward looking model that incorporates a lag. We
found that any given equilibrium may be viewed, or represented, in two fun-
damentally diﬀerent ways: in the usual way, as a linear dependence on once
and twice lagged endogenous variables and on a sunspot having zero condi-
tional mean; and in a new way, on once lagged endogenous variables and on
a sunspot exhibiting serial correlation. We referred to the usual way of view-
ing sunspots as the “general form” representation of the equilibrium, and to
the new way of viewing sunspots as the “common factor” representation of
the equilibrium.6 We found that the stability of the equilibrium in question
depended on the chosen representation. In particular, for the model we con-
sidered, stable common factor sunspots were found to exist in abundance,
even though, as was already well known, there exist no stable general form
sunspots.
This new line of research indicates the need for careful analysis of sunspot
stability in applied models. Every sunspot equilibrium has a common factor
representation, and the stability properties of common factor representations
are diﬀerent from their general form counterparts. Thus, stability analysis
must incorporate both general form and common factor representations. In
this paper, we generalize common factor analysis to apply to standard mod-
els of monetary policy, and carefully investigate the stability of the resulting
representations. We follow (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Honkapohja and
Mitra 2001) by specifying a simple New Keynesian IS-AS model, except that,
for added generality, as in (Galí and Gertler 1999) and much applied work, we
6
In (Evans and McGough 2002b) we show that common factor sunspot representations
exist in some cases where ﬁnite state Markov sunspot solutions do not exist.
We remark that (Evans and McGough 2002b) and (Evans and McGough 2003) focus on
models with real roots, but we show elsewhere that coomon factor sunspots representations
exist more generally when there are complex roots.
4
allow for some dependence on lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve. We close
the model with a variety of interest rate rules: like Bullard and Mitra, we
consider rules depending on current, lagged, and expected inﬂation; and like
Honkapohja and Mitra, we also consider rules depending on lagged nominal
interest rates. For each model we consider three calibrations of the IS-AS
structure, as well as some alternative parameter values. Analytic results
are, in general, unavailable, and so we test stability numerically by consid-
ering, for each calibration, a lattice over the space of policy parameters. At
each point in the lattice, indeterminacy and stability of the corresponding
equilibria are examined. Our main result supports the ﬁndings and advice
of Honkapohja and Mitra, and indeed it makes their cautionary note more
urgent: All models in which the policy rule depends on some form of expec-
tations of future variables exhibit stable common factor sunspots for some
parameter values. To be sure, these parameter values are not always rea-
sonable, but, in some cases, they closely match calibrations. Furthermore,
these stable sunspots exist even when the policy rule also depends on other
aggregates, such as current inﬂation or output, and lagged interest rate. We
also ﬁnd that no general form sunspots are stable, thus emphasizing the
importance of analyzing common factor representations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the various mon-
etary models under consideration, as well as the associated learning theory
and the extension of common factor analysis to monetary models. To con-
serve space and facilitate comprehension, we include explicit computations
of equilibrium representations in the Appendix and for only one policy rule,
and simply note that the remaining policy rules can be analyzed in a similar
fashion. Section three contains the results of our investigations. The policy
rules are classiﬁed into four types and discussed in separate subsections. In
each case we consider numerous permutations of calibration, Phillips curve
structure, indeterminacy nature, and representation type, and thus a careful
catalog of all possible results would be tedious if not infeasible. Therefore, we
provide a summary of the main features followed by a more careful discussion
of the particularly interesting results. Section four concludes.
2 Theory
In this section we develop the theory necessary to analyze the stability of
sunspot equilibria. We begin by specifying the models of interest. Then, for
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expedience, we choose a particular speciﬁcation and develop the associated
equilibrium representations and learning analysis. It is straightforward to
modify this developed theory for application to other model speciﬁcations,
and thus we omit the details concerning these other models. We initially
develop the theory under the rational expectations assumption. Then, be-
ginning in Section 2.4, we relax this assumption and study the stability of
the solutions under adaptive learning.
2.1 Monetary Models and Policy Rules
We explore the possibility of existence of stable sunspots using several vari-
ants of the New Keynesian Monetary model. All speciﬁcations have in com-
mon the following forward looking IS-AS curves:
IS : x
t
= −φ(i
t
− E
t
π
t+1
) + E
t
x
t+1
+ g
t
(1)
AS : π
t
= β(γE
t
π
t+1
+ (1− γ)π
t−1
) + λx
t
+ u
t
(2)
Here x
t
is the proportional output gap, π
t
is the inﬂation rate, and g
t
and
u
t
are independent, exogenous, stationary, zero mean AR(1) shocks with
damping parameters 0 ≤ ρ
g
< 1 and 0 ≤ ρ
u
< 1 respectively.
Equation (1) is the “IS” relationship obtained by log-linearizing the Euler
equation for consumer optimization and using the GDP identity. This yields
a unit coeﬃcient on E
t
x
t+1
.7 When γ = 1, equation (2) is the pure forward-
looking New Keynesian “AS” relationship based on “Calvo pricing,” and
employed in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) and Ch. 3 of (Woodford 2003).8
Here 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Again, this equation is obtained as
the linearization around a steady state. The speciﬁcation of the AS curve in
the case 0 < γ < 1 incorporates an inertial term and is similar in spirit to
(Fuhrer and Moore 1995), the Section 4 model of (Galí and Gertler 1999),
and the Ch. 3, Section 3.2 model of (Woodford 2003), each of which allows
for some backward looking elements. Models with 0 < γ < 1 are often called
“hybrid” models, and we remark that in some versions, such as (Fuhrer and
Moore 1995), β = 1, so that the sum of forward and backward looking
components sum to one, while in other versions β < 1 is possible.
The region and nature of a model’s indeterminacy depends critically on
the speciﬁcation of the policy rule. To better understand the role of this
7
See, for example, Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, Section 1, of (Woodford 2003).
8
For the version with mark-up shocks see (Woodford 2003) Chapter 6, Section 4.6.
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speciﬁcation, we analyze a number of policy rules, which we parameterize as
follows:
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PR
1
, PR′
1
, PR
2
, and PR
3
are the rules examined by (Bullard and Mitra
2002). We have omitted the intercepts for convenience, and in each policy
rule π
t
can be interpreted as the deviation of inﬂation from its target. These
are all Taylor-type rules in the spirit of (Taylor 1993). We assume throughout
that α
π
, α
x
≥ 0 and thus the α
π
π
t
term in PR
1
indicates the degree to which
monetary policy authorities raise nominal interest rates in response to an
upward deviation of π
t
from its target. PR
1
assumes that current data on
inﬂation and the output gap are available to policymakers when interest
rates are set. Given the criticism that this assumption is not realistic, a
point emphasized in (McCallum 1999), (Bullard and Mitra 2002) look at
three natural alternatives: a slight modiﬁcation yields PR′
1
in which policy
makers condition their instrument on expected values of current inﬂation and
the output gap; in PR
2
policy makers respond to the most recent observed
values of these variables; and in PR
3
they respond instead to forecasts of
future inﬂation and the output gap.9 Finally, PR
4
is the rule examined in
the theoretical part of (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000), and is the simplest
form of the empirical interest rate rules that they estimate. A parameter
value 0 < θ < 1 corresponds to inertia in interest rate setting, with policy-
makers responding gradually to changes in information.
2.2 Determinacy
As usual, the model is said to be determinate if there is a unique nonexplosive
REE and indeterminate if there are multiple nonexplosive solutions (though
9
Because at the moment we are assuming rational expectations and a common infor-
mation set, we do not need to specify whose forecasts are represented in the interest rate
rules (4), (6) and (7). We will return to this matter when we discuss the economy under
learning.
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we will see below that this deﬁnition can be reﬁned in a helpful way).10
The determinacy of a model can be analyzed by writing the reduced form
equation as a discrete diﬀerence equation with the associated extraneous
noise terms capturing the errors in the agents’ forecasts of the free variables.
If the nonexplosive requirement of a rational expectations equilibrium pins
down the forecast errors, that is, if the dimension of the unstable manifold
is equal to the number of free variables, then the model is determinate. On
the other hand, if the errors are not pinned down, that is, if the dimension of
the unstable manifold is less than the number of free variables, these forecast
errors can capture extrinsic ﬂuctuations in agents’ expectations that are not
inconsistent with rationality. In this case, multiple equilibria exist; these
types of equilibria are sometimes called sunspots.
To illustrate our methodology, consider PR
1
or PR
3
. Combining the
policy rule (3) or (6) with (1) and (2) leads to the ﬁrst-order reduced form
H
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The speciﬁc form of F,H are given in the Appendix for PR
1
. Let the free
variables be written y
t
= (x
t
, π
t
)′, so that ε
t
= y
t
−E
t−1
y
t
is the forecast error,
thus capturing potential sunspots. Writing also yˆ
t
= (x
t
, π
t
, π
t−1
, g
t
, u
t
)′ and
w
t
= (wg
t
, wu
t
)′ the model can be rewritten as
yˆ
t
= F−1Hyˆ
t−1
+ F−1Mw
t
+Nε
t
(8)
for suitable M,N . Here we are using the fact that F is invertible. Note that
by virtue of the rational expectations assumption ε
t
is a martingale diﬀerence
sequence, i.e. a stochastic process such that E
t
ε
t+1
= 0.
Recall that a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is any process y
t
that satisﬁes the reduced form equations and is nonexplosive. The above
analysis has shown that if y
t
is an REE then there is a martingale diﬀerence
sequence (mds) ε
t
such that the associated process yˆ
t
solves (8). However,
10
By “nonexplosive” we mean that the conditional expectation of the absolute value of
future variables is uniformly bounded over the horizon. For a detailed discussion of this
and related concepts see (Evans and McGough 2003).
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there is no guarantee that a given mds ε
t
yields a nonexplosive solution; it is
precisely this issue that is addressed by the nature of the indeterminacy.
To understand for which mds ε
t
the model is nonexplosive, we assume
that F−1H is diagonalizable and factor it as F−1H = S(Λ⊕ ρ)S−1. Here we
employ the direct sum notation
A⊕B =
(
A 0
0 B
)
for matrices A and B. ρ is a diagonal 2 × 2 matrix with diagonal elements
ρ
g
and ρ
u
and Λ contains the remaining three eigenvalues of F−1H. We then
change coordinates to z
t
= S−1yˆ
t
, thus allowing us to rewrite (8) as
z
t
= (Λ⊕ ρ)z
t−1
+ w˜
t
+ ε˜
t
, (9)
where w˜
t
= S−1F−1Mw
t
and ε˜
t
= S−1Nε
t
. If the eigenvalues of F−1H are
all real then the columns of S are the corresponding linearly independent
eigenvectors. If two eigenvalues are complex then we assume that the matrix
of eigenvectors, S and the matrix of eigenvalues Λ are altered to allow for a
matrix factorization with real entries. This can be achieved via the following
observation: If A is a real 2× 2 matrix with complex eigenvalues µ± iν and
complex eigenvectors u± iv then
A = S
[
µ −ν
ν µ
]
S−1
where the columns of S are v and u. If A is n×n then it can be decomposed
similarly as SDS−1 with D a block diagonal matrix with the real eigenvalues
and 2 × 2 blocks corresponding to the complex eigenvalues on its diagonal.
Also, here and throughout the paper, the eigenvalues in Λ are assumed or-
dered in decreasing magnitude.
Now the conditions for determinacy are clear. If λ
1
and λ
2
lie outside
the unit circle, then nonexplosiveness requires z
it
= 0 for i = 1, 2. Thus
the forecast errors are pinned down by the requirement that w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
= 0
for i = 1, 2; that is, the dimension of the unstable manifold, which in this
simple linear framework is the direct sum of the eigenspaces corresponding
to the explosive eigenvalues, is two, and there is a unique mds ε
t
such that
the associated process y
t
is nonexplosive.
If |λ
1
| > 1 and |λ
2
| < 1 then the only implied restriction is that z
1t
= 0.
The forecast errors must satisfy w˜
1t
+ ε˜
1t
= 0 but are otherwise unrestricted.
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Thus there is a one dimensional continuum of equilibria, and, consequently,
we say the model exhibits order one indeterminacy. Finally, if λ
i
is in the
unit circle for all i, the process y
t
is nonexplosive regardless of the mds ε
t
.
There is a two dimensional continuum of equilibria, and we say the model
exhibits order two indeterminacy.
We have focused on cases of determinacy and indeterminacy, but one
other possibility should be noted. If |λ
3
| > 1, so that there are three roots
outside the unit circle, then the model is explosive: there exist no nonexplo-
sive solutions and with probability one at least one of the components of y
t
tends to inﬁnity in absolute value as t→∞.
2.3 Representations
A rational expectations equilibrium representation (REER) is a discrete dif-
ference equation, any solution to which is an REE. As is now well known,
see e.g. Chapters 8 and 9 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001), (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003c) and (Evans and McGough 2003), a given REE may have
many representations, and the stability of the REE under learning may be
representation dependent. In this subsection we construct the representations
of interest, noting that the particular form of the representation depends on
the nature of the indeterminacy.
Assume ﬁrst that for i = 1, 2 we have |λ
i
| > 1 and also assume that
|λ
3
| < 1. For the solution to be nonexplosive the mds sunspots ε
1t
and
ε
2t
must be chosen so that ε˜
it
+ w˜
it
= 0 for i = 1 and 2. The associated
representation is given by
y
t
= −(S11
2
)−1
(
0 S13
0 S23
)
y
t−1
− (S11
2
)−1S14
2
gˆ
t
, (10)
where for convenience, we write gˆ
t
= (g
t
, u
t
)′. Here and in the sequel, Sij =
(S−1)
ij
and
Sij
k
=
(
Sij Sij+1
Skj Skj+1
)
.
Thus, in the determinate case, the unique nonexplosive solution takes the
form
y
t
= a+ by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
, (11)
where a = 0 because in the structural equations we have omitted intercepts.
We include the intercept term a here and below because under learning agents
will be assumed to estimate its value.
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2.3.1 Order One Indeterminacy.
Order one indeterminacy occurs when |λ
1
| > 1 and the remaining eigenvalues
have norm less than one. Notice this implies λ
1
is real; however λ
i
for i > 1
may be complex. For reasons discussed below, in the indeterminate case, we
only consider real eigenvalues. To obtain a nonexplosive solution, we require
that z
1t
= 0, and that the mds ε
t
satisfy ε˜
1t
+ w˜
1t
= 0. We now proceed to
develop the general form and common factor representations.
General Form Representations: As is shown in the Appendix, imposing
the restriction z
1t
= 0 for all t leads to General Form (GF) representations
y
t
= a + by
t−1
+ hy
t−2
+ cgˆ
t
+ f gˆ
t−1
+ eξ
t
. (12)
where ξ
t
is an arbitrary one-dimensional mds and a = 0. There are actually
two representations of this form, i.e. two distinct nontrivial sets of parameter
coeﬃcients (b, h, c, d) which yield solutions of this form. These are obtained
by combining z
1t
= 0 with either the i = 2 or i = 3 equation from (9), i.e.
with
z
it
= λ
i
z
it−1
+ w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
(13)
and then using the deﬁnition of z
t
to rewrite the equation in term of y
t
. The
Appendix gives details. Note that the General Form representations express
the REE as a dependence of the endogenous variables on two lags, current
and lagged intrinsic noise, and a sunspot exhibiting no serial correlation.11
Common Factor Representations: As with the general form representa-
tion we impose z
1t
= 0 and that the mds ε
t
satisfy ε˜
1t
+ w˜
1t
= 0. There will
be two Common Factor (CF) representations, again obtained by combining
z
1t
= 0 with (13) for either i = 2 or i = 3. However, we now rewrite (13) as
z
it
= (1− λ
i
L)−1(w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
).
We interpret the noise term on the right to be a sunspot ζ
t
and thus write
z
it
= ζ
t
with
ζ
t
= λ
i
ζ
t−1
+ ε˘
t
,
where ε˘
t
= w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
. Note that since only one dimension of ε
t
is restricted,
we can take ε˘
t
to be an arbitrary univariate mds. Combining this with the
11
Our method for computing the GF representations (12) is closely related to the so-
lution method for the “irregular case” described in Chapter 10, Appendix 2, of (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001) and which was used to obtain the VARMA solutions given in
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001).
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restriction z
1t
= 0 and using the deﬁnition of z
t
yields a CF representation
of the form
y
t
= a+ by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
+ dζ
t
, (14)
and a = 0. Again there are two CF representations of this form. Note that in
these representations, the endogenous variables depend on one lag, current
intrinsic noise, and a serially correlated sunspot.
For reasons that are now apparent, complex eigenvalues pose diﬃculties
for common factor representations; if λ
i
is complex, it is not possible to write
the sunspot ζ
t
as a serially correlated process with real damping parameter.
This problem is not insurmountable - in fact we consider it in another pa-
per - however, we feel it is best avoided for now, as our story is well told
by focusing on the real case.12 Therefore, throughout the paper, our analy-
sis in the indeterminate region pertains to representations obtained via real
eigenvalues.
2.3.2 Order Two Indeterminacy
General Form Representations: Now all eigenvalues are in the unit circle
and thus there is no concern over the nonexplosiveness restriction. Pick
real eigenvalues λ
i
, and λ
j
, where i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j. Combining the
two equations (13) for i and j with the deﬁnition of z
t
we obtain three
representations of the form (12) except that now ξ
t
is an arbitrary two-
dimensional mds. See the Appendix for details on the required (b, h, c, d).
Common Factor Representations: Combining the two i = j equations
from (13) and deﬁning the VAR sunspot
ζ
t
= (λ
i
⊕ λ
j
)ζ
t−1
+
(
w˜
it
w˜
jt
)
+
(
ε˜
it
ε˜
jt
)
,
12
In the case of complex eigenvalues, one must simultaneously incorporate the nonexplo-
siveness condition z
1t
= 0 and both complex eigenvalues, thus representing the sunspot as
a VAR. This does not pose a problem; however, once learning is incorporated, diﬃculties
arise. Speciﬁcally, the PLM associated with a complex common factor representation is
underspeciﬁed out of equilibrium, as there is no explicit dependence on lagged endoge-
nous variables. This implies that the T-map must be formed using orthogonal projections.
Again, this is straightforward, in theory; however, to compute the eigenvalues of the Ja-
cobian of the T-map, one must diﬀerentiate endogenously determined second moments.
We have worked out the details of this analysis for the models considered here, and initial
investigations reveal no stable sunspots. Therefore, due to the technical nature of this
exercise, as well as the fact that it does not appear to add important details to our current
story, we present these results in a diﬀerent work.
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we obtain CF representations of the form (14) except that now of course ζ
t
is
two-dimensional. Again, further details on (b, c) are given in the Appendix.
2.3.3 Discussion
For PR
1
and PR
3
with γ = 1 the procedure to provide solution representa-
tions could be simpliﬁed since π
t−1
no longer appears in the structural equa-
tions. π
t−1
could thus be dropped from the ﬁrst-order form of the model.
However, the above analysis does also cover this case. If γ = 1 then in the
determinate case b = 0. Similarly, when γ = 1 and the model is indetermi-
nate, the general form representations satisfy h = 0. In this case one of the
CF representations satisﬁes b = 0, with a serially correlated sunspot ζ
t
, and
the other CF representation has a serially uncorrelated sunspot with b = 0.
We also provide a brief discussion of REERs under policy rules PR
2
and
PR
4
. In the case of PR
2
, given by (5), the state variable in the ﬁrst-order
form must be enlarged to include x
t−1
. Then yˆ
t
= (x
t
, π
t
, π
t−1
, x
t−1
, g
t
, u
t
)′
and z
t
becomes 6 × 1. The methodology for obtaining solutions is analo-
gous and in fact the form of the solution representations for y
t
= (x
t
, π
t
)
is as above. For PR
4
, given by (7), the state vector is written as yˆ
t
=
(x
t
, π
t
, i
t
, π
t−1
, i
t−1
, g
t
, u
t
)′, z
t
is 7 × 1 and y
t
= (x
t
, π
t
, i
t
)′. However, the
procedure for determining REERs remains analogous.
We close this section with a brief remark on an aspect of the time series
properties of sunspot equilibria. Consider the CF representations (14). If
the exogenous sunspot variable ζ
t
is independent of the intrinsic shocks gˆ
t
,
then it is easily veriﬁed that the endogenous variables y
t
have larger variances
than are present in the corresponding minimal state variable solution y
t
=
a + by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
. Policy makers that aim to minimize output and inﬂation
volatility would thus want to avoid interest rate rules consistent with the
existence of CF sunspot solutions, at least if these solutions are stable under
learning. We now turn to this issue, i.e. to the question of the stability of
the various solutions under least squares learning.
2.4 Learning
We use expectational stability as our criterion for judging whether agents may
be able to coordinate on speciﬁc solutions, including in particular sunspot
equilibria. This is because, for a wide range of models and solutions, E-
stability has been shown to govern the local stability of rational expectations
13
equilibria under least squares learning. In many cases this correspondence
can be proved, and in cases where this cannot be formally demonstrated the
“E-stability principle” has been validated through simulations. Before giving
details, we provide an overview of E-stability; for further reading see (Evans
and Honkapohja 2001).
The models analyzed in this paper can be written in reduced form as
follows:13
y
t
= AE∗
t
y
t+1
+By
t−1
+ Cgˆ
t
. (15)
We now write E∗
t
y
t+1
to indicate that we no longer impose rational expecta-
tions, and at issue is how agents form their time t expectations E∗
t
. Backing
away from the benchmark that agents are fully rational, we assume that
agents believe the endogenous variable y
t
depends linearly on lagged en-
dogenous variables, current (and possibly lagged) exogenous shocks gˆ
t
, and
exogenous sunspots. The latter will either be serially uncorrelated or have an
AR(1) structure. Combining these regressors into the vectorX
t
, we postulate
a perceived law of motion (PLM) y
t
= Θ′X
t
. Agents then use this perceived
law of motion to form their expectations of y
t+1
. A rational expectations
solution will correspond to one or more values for the parameter vector Θ.
Under real-time learning agents will estimate Θ using an algorithm such
as recursive least squares and these estimates will be updated over time.
Given a particular value for Θ the corresponding expectations E∗
t
y
t+1
can be
computed, the expectations can be substituted in the reduced form equation
above, and the true data generating process, or actual law of motion (ALM),
thus determined. If the perceived law of motion is well speciﬁed then the ac-
tual law of motion will have the same form: y
t
= T (Θ)′X
t
. In particular, the
ALMwill depend linearly on the same variables as did the PLM. Thus a map,
known as the T-map, is constructed, taking the perceived parameters to the
implied parameters. A ﬁxed point of this map constitutes a representation
of a rational expectations equilibrium.
We note that associated with a given reduced form model there may be
multiple well-speciﬁed PLMs, and the speciﬁcation of the PLM determines
the representation of the REE that agents are trying to learn. For example,
it is reasonable for X
t
to include a constant, once lagged y, current gˆ, and
the serially correlated sunspot ζ; in this case agents would be trying to learn
a common factor representation. It is also reasonable for X
t
to include a
13
When PR
′
1
is used the reduced form also depends on expectations of contemporaneous
endogenous variables E
∗
t
y
t
. This extended reduced form is considered in the Appendix.
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constant, once and twice lagged y, current and once lagged gˆ, and a mds
noise term ξ; in this case agents would be trying to learn a general form
representation. Finally, we note that a ﬁxed point of the T-map deﬁnes not
just an equilibrium, but also a representation of that equilibrium.
Once the T-map is obtained, the stability under learning of a particular
representation can be addressed as follows. Let the equilibrium represen-
tation be characterized by the ﬁxed point Θ∗, and consider the diﬀerential
equation
dΘ
dτ
= T (Θ)−Θ. (16)
Notice that Θ∗ is a rest point of this ordinary diﬀerential equation. The
representation corresponding to the ﬁxed point is said to be E-stable if it is
a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of (16). The E-stability principle
tells us that E-stable representations are locally learnable for Least Squares
and closely related algorithms. That is, if Θ
t
is the time t estimate of the
coeﬃcient vector Θ, and if Θ
t
is updated over time using recursive least
squares, then Θ∗ is a possible convergence point, i.e. locally Θ
t
→ Θ∗ if and
only if Θ∗ is E-stable. The intuition behind this principle is that a reasonable
learning algorithm, such as least squares, would gradually adjust estimates
Θ
t
in the direction of the actual parameters T (Θ
t
) that are generating the
data. For an E-stable ﬁxed pointΘ∗ such a procedure would then be expected
to converge locally.
The above discussion has implicitly assumed a rest point Θ∗ that is locally
isolated. In this case it is locally asymptotically stable under (16) provided
all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of T at Θ∗ have real parts less than one,
and it is unstable if the Jacobian has at least one eigenvalue with real part
greater than one. Because we are studying sunspot equilibria, the set of
rest points of (16) may have unbounded continua as connected components.
Along these components the T map will always be neutrally stable, and thus
will have at least one eigenvalue equal to unity.14 In this case we say a
sunspot equilibrium representation is E-stable if the Jacobian of the T -map
has eigenvalues with real part less than one, apart from unit eigenvalues
arising from the equilibrium connected components.
We consider separately the determinate and two indeterminate cases.
14
The number of unit eigenvalues will be equal to the dimension of these components.
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2.4.1 Determinate case
The real and complex cases can be handled simultaneously. Agents are as-
sumed to have the PLM (11). As indicated above, we make the (fairly stan-
dard) assumption that, for agents forming expectations at time t, the current
value of y
t
is not in the information set, but all time t exogenous variables, as
well as lagged values of y, are known at t. From the PLM y
t
= a+ by
t−1
+cgˆ
t
we compute E∗
t
y
t+1
= a+ bE∗
t
y
t
+ cE∗
t
gˆ
t+1
. Using E∗
t
y
t
= a+ by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
, and
assuming for convenience that ρ is known so that E∗
t
gˆ
t+1
= ρgˆ
t
, yields
E∗
t
y
t+1
= (I
2
+ b)a + b2y
t−1
+ (bc + cρ)gˆ
t
.
Inserting this expression into (15) and solving for y
t
as a linear function of
an intercept, y
t−1
and gˆ
t
yields the T-map given by
a → A(I
2
+ b)a (17)
b → Ab2 + B (18)
c → A(bc+ cρ) + C. (19)
The relevant Jacobians are given by
DT
a
= A(I
2
+ b) (20)
DT
b
= b′ ⊗A+ I
2
⊗ Ab (21)
DT
c
= I
2
⊗ Ab+ ρ′ ⊗ A, (22)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of two matrices.
2.4.2 Order One Indeterminacy
We employ the same notation as above and consider common factor and
general form representations separately. We consider common factor repre-
sentations ﬁrst because their form is quite similar to the representation of
determinate equilibria.15 In each case we compute E∗
t
y
t+1
for the assumed
PLM, insert into (15) and solve for y
t
as a linear function of the explanatory
variables contained in the PLM. We omit the details, which are straightfor-
ward, and simply write down the T-map and corresponding Jacobians.
15
This is not simple coincidence and helps explain why common factor representations
may be stable when general form representations are not.
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Common Factor Representations: If the roots are real then ζ
t
is AR(1).
Agents are assumed to have the PLM (14). The T-map is given by equations
(17)-(19) and
d→ A(bd+ dλ
i
). (23)
The relevant Jacobians are given by (20)-(22) and
DT
d
= A(b+ I
2
(λ
i
)),
where I
2
(x) = x⊕ x.
General Form Representations: Agents are assumed to have the PLM
(12). The corresponding T-map is given by equation (17) together with
b → A(b2 + h) +B (24)
h → Abh (25)
c → A(bc+ cρ + d) + C (26)
f → Abf (27)
e → Abe. (28)
The relevant Jacobians are given by (20), (22), DT
f
= I
2
⊗ Ab, DT
e
= Ab,
and
DT
bh
=
(
b′ ⊗ A+ I
2
⊗ Ab I
2
⊗ A
h′ ⊗A I
2
⊗ Ab
)
2.4.3 Order Two Indeterminacy
The analysis is almost the same as for order one indeterminacy. Learning
the CF-representation in the case of order two indeterminacy is aﬀected only
in that the sunspot is now a VAR so that the T-map in the d variable is
amended to have the form
d→ Abd+ Ad(λ
i
⊕ λ
j
).
The associated Jacobian is
DT
d
= I
2
⊗ Ab+ (λ
i
⊕ λ
j
)⊗A.
Analysis of learning the GF-representation in case of order two indeter-
minacy is the same as for order one indeterminacy.
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3 Results
We studied stability of general form and common factor sunspots in ﬁve
models, which diﬀered only in the speciﬁcation of the monetary policy rule,
and the models are identiﬁed by the number of the corresponding policy rule
as given by equations (3)-(7). The models were analyzed using three diﬀerent
calibrations of the parameters in the IS-AS curves, as due to (Woodford
1999), (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) and (McCallum and Nelson 1999);
the relevant parameter values are given in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Calibrations
Author(s) φ λ
W 1/.157 .024
CGG 1 .3
MN .164 .3
For convenience in interpreting the numerical results below we note that
1/.157  6.3694 .
Also, each policy rule was analyzed both with and without lagged inﬂation
in the AS equation (or Phillips curve). With pure Calvo pricing, and thus
no inﬂation inertia in the AS equation, the discount rate β was set equal
to .99 following W, CGG, and MN16. When lagged inﬂation was included
γ was set equal to one half, and we set β = 1, thereby imposing that the
sum of the coeﬃcients on inﬂation equals one. Finally, for all policy rules,
the exogenous noise terms were taken to have damping parameter equal to
.9. For each calibration (and for γ = 1 and .5), a lattice over the square
(0, 10) × (0, 10) in policy space (α
π
, α
x
) was analyzed. For PR
4
we also
computed results for several values of θ.
Some general results were found across all or most of the policy rules
and calibrations investigated, and are therefore worth summarizing before
presenting more speciﬁc results in detail. Throughout this section we will
use “stable” to mean “stable under learning” as determined by E-stability.
1. In no case were General Form sunspot solutions stable.
16
With γ = 1, the coeﬃcient β modifying the expectations term in the AS equation
results from the optimal price setting behavior of the agents. However, more traditional
speciﬁcations of the Phillips curve often specify this coeﬃcient equal to one. For the case
γ = 1 and β = 0.99 we checked for robustness against γ = 1 and β = 1 and, except where
indicated, found little impact on our results.
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2. In the determinate case the unique nonexplosive solution is usually
stable under learning: the exceptions are PR
2
, and with low γ, PR
3
, in
which unstable cases exist.
3. The explosive case arises for PR
2
, and with low values of γ, for all
policy rules.
4. Order two indeterminacy exists only for PR
3
and is never stable.
5. Common Factor sunspot solutions exist17 for all forms of the policy
rule, but they are only stable for PR
3
and PR
4
.
6. Stable CF sunspots arise with γ = 0.5 as well as in the purely forward
looking case γ = 1.
3.1 Policy Rule 1
As noted in Section 2, policy rule 1 has a natural variant, which we label
PR′
1
. We summarize the results for PR
1
and PR′
1
in separate subsections
below.
3.1.1 PR
1
For ease of exposition, we restate, at the beginning of each subsection, the
speciﬁcation of the relevant policy rule. PR
1
is given by
PR
1
: i
t
= α
π
π
t
+ α
x
x
t
.
PR
1
with γ = 1 (i.e. no lagged inﬂation in the AS) has been analyzed by a
number of authors, including (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (Honkapohja and
Mitra 2001). Bullard and Mitra found that the region in policy space corre-
sponding to E-stability is precisely the region corresponding to determinacy;
this result was obtained analytically and is independent of calibration.18 Be-
cause of this result, Bullard and Mitra would recommend this policy rule if it
17
In line with our earlier discussion, the statement “Common Factor sunspot solutions
exist” is now to be interpreted as asserting the existence of CF sunspot representations
based on real roots.
18
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) obtain the additional result, for γ = 1, that what we
call GF sunspot solutions are not stable. See their Proposition 4, which also covers PR
3
for the case γ = 1.
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were feasible. However, as discussed above, it is widely agreed that current
values of inﬂation and GDP are not available to policymakers. We include
results for this policy rule primarily because it serves as a useful benchmark.
We ﬁnd that the result of Bullard and Mitra is robust to the inclusion of
inﬂation inertia in the Phillips curve: in all cases investigated, determinacy
implies stability under learning. In addition, when the model is indetermi-
nate no solutions are stable, including CF sunspot solutions.
An example lattice is plotted in Figure 1 for the Woodford calibration
with γ = 1. Here and in all ﬁgures containing lattice plots, each lattice
point is marked with a symbol indicating properties of the associated steady
state: lattice points associated with determinate steady states are marked
with an ‘×’; lattice points associated with indeterminate steady states and for
which common factor representations exist (i.e. there exist at least two real
eigenvalues) are marked with a ‘∗’, and lattice points associated with indeter-
minate steady states for which no common factor representations exist (i.e.
there exists at most one real eigenvalue) are marked with a ‘·’. Also, if there
exists a stable representation associated with the steady state, the symbol
marking the lattice point is circled. CF sunspots exist for all indeterminate
cases, a ﬁnding that extends to the other calibrations with γ = 1.
Figure 1 Here
Figure 2 shows the regions of determinacy and indeterminacy pertaining
to the CGG calibration with γ = .5. The main result that all CF and GF
sunspots are unstable still holds, but the region of determinacy is altered and
here it is no longer the case that CF sunspots always exist. The failure of
CF sunspots to exist seems to depend principally on the inertial term in the
Phillips curve. When γ is set equal to one, all indeterminate steady states
support common factor sunspots. The MN calibration yields much the same
picture as the CGG calibration. Note that the range of policy parameters
displayed does not necessarily coincide with the 10× 10 grid, and also varies
across ﬁgures; this was done to emphasize features particular to given ﬁgures.
Figure 2 Here
One further result of interest (not shown) is that suﬃciently low values of
γ > 0 together with passive response to inﬂation (low α
π
) can yield the
explosive case.
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Under our information assumptions, when policymakers use PR
1
they ef-
fectively have an information advantage relative to private agents. This is
because policymakers are conditioning policy on contemporaneous endoge-
nous variables, which are assumed not available to private agents when their
forming expectations. This information asymmetry does not arise under PR′
1
to which we now turn.
3.1.2 PR′
1
PR′
1
is given by
PR′
1
: i
t
= α
π
E∗
t
π
t
+ α
x
E∗
t
x
t
.
This policy can be thought of as a contemporaneous rule that is feasible even
if current values of the endogenous variables π
t
and x
t
are not known at time
t. We continue to make the assumption that all t-dated exogenous variables
and all lagged variables are observed prior to expectations formation. As
discussed further in Section 3.3, below, we are also making the homogeneous
expectations assumption that policymakers and private agents form expec-
tations in the same way. In contrast to our PR
1
, under PR′
1
policy makers
and private agents are treated as having the same information set.
In a rational expectations equilibrium E
t
π
t
= π
t
and E
t
x
t
= x
t
. This
implies that the REE, their representations, and the regions of determinacy,
indeterminacy, and explosiveness will be precisely as they were under PR
1
.
However, out of equilibrium, agents may make errors when forecasting cur-
rent values of the endogenous variables. In particular, because learning
dynamics are in part determined by out of equilibrium behavior, the stabil-
ity properties of the model under PR′
1
may be diﬀerent than under PR
1
: see
the Appendix for details on how the learning analysis is altered.
(Bullard and Mitra 2002) analyzed PR′
1
, though with a slightly diﬀerent
interpretation of the timing structure: they assume that expectations formed
at t use only information available at time t− 1. Although this diﬀers from
our assumption that exogenous variables at time t are part of the information
set, it can be veriﬁed that the E-stability conditions are identical for the two
information assumptions. Bullard and Mitra show, analytically, that their
results for PR
1
hold also for PR′
1
. In particular, the regions of determinacy
are the same for both policy rules, and, for each policy rule, a steady state
is stable under learning if and only if it is determinate.
We obtain the same correspondence and ﬁnd that it also extends to the
stability of sunspot solutions. We have already noted that the regions of de-
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terminacy, indeterminacy, and explosiveness are the same for PR
1
and PR′
1
.
In addition, our numerical analysis indicates that for all parameter combi-
nations considered, all determinate steady-states are stable under learning,
and no stable indeterminacies exist. Our results thus tend to reinforce those
of (Bullard and Mitra 2002), who in consequence recommend Taylor rules of
the form PR′
1
with α
π
> 1.
3.2 Policy Rule 2
PR
2
is given by
PR
2
: i
t
= α
π
π
t−1
+ α
x
x
t−1
.
PR
2
, with γ = 1, was also studied by Bullard and Mitra. Numerically, and
using the Woodford calibration, they found that, unlike PR
1
, there were
determinate cases for which the REE was not stable under learning. They
concluded that policy rules dependent on lagged output gap and inﬂation may
not be advisable because agents may fail to coordinate on the equilibrium
even though it is unique. We ﬁnd that this result is robust to the calibrations
considered here and extends to the speciﬁcation with inertial inﬂation in the
Phillips curve. Figure 3 gives an example plot using the CGG calibration
and with γ = .5. In this Figure, lattice points left unmarked correspond to
explosive steady states.
Figure 3 Here
Aggressive response to output gap and inﬂation may yield explosive steady
states. In fact, using the Woodford calibration one obtains that even passive
response to output gap (α
x
> .35), together with a Taylor rule α
π
> 1, can
yield an explosive steady state. In the indeterminate region CF representa-
tions exist but they are not stable.
3.3 Policy Rule 3
PR
3
is given by
PR
3
: i
t
= α
π
E∗
t
π
t+1
+ α
x
E∗
t
x
t+1
.
Before giving the results we discuss the interpretation of this rule under learn-
ing. Under least squares learning private agents are assumed to recursively
estimate the parameters of their PLM and use the estimated forecasting
22
model to form the expectations E∗
t
π
t+1
and E∗
t
x
t+1
that enter into their de-
cisions as captured by the IS and AS curves. Under PR
3
and PR
4
forecasts
also enter into the policy rule. Because we are now relaxing the rational ex-
pectations assumption, one can in principle distinguish between the forecasts
of the private sector, which enter the IS and AS curves, and the forecasts of
the Central Bank, which enter policy rule PR
3
or PR
4
. We will instead adopt
the simplest assumption for studying stability under learning, which is that
the forecasts for the private sector and the Central Bank are identical. This
can either be because private agents and the Central Bank use the same least
squares learning scheme, or it could be because one group relies on the others’
forecasts. In the latter case, for example, the Central Bank might be setting
interest rates as a reaction to private sector forecasts, as in (Bernanke and
Woodford 1997) or (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). The homogeneous ex-
pectations assumption was also adopted in (Bullard and Mitra 2002).19 Since
we are searching for stable sunspot equilibria, the homogeneous expectations
assumption appears to give the greatest likelihood for ﬁnding them.
We now turn to the results. For policy rule PR
3
, under the calibrations
studied, all determinate steady states are stable and no explosive steady
states are observed.20 However, in contrast to PR
1
and PR
2
, policy rule
PR
3
can exhibit stable sunspots, and the region of stability may include
economically reasonable parameter values. This result corroborates and ex-
tends those of (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001), who showed the existence of
stable noisy K-state Markov sunspots for this policy rule. We discuss the
relationship of our results to theirs below.
For the W and CGG calibrations, and for both values of γ, stable common
factor representations exist. For the CGG calibration the region of stability
requires aggressive (“active”) policy response to both the output gap and to
inﬂation, i.e. α
π
> 1 and α
x
> 1. Although the “Taylor principle” speciﬁcally
recommends α
π
> 1, output gap responses of α
x
> 1 might be considered too
aggressive. However, using the W calibration, stable CF sunspots arise with
very plausible policy settings, including in particular the benchmark choice
α
π
= 1.5 and α
x
= 0.5 discussed by (Taylor 1993). (For the MN calibrations,
stable CF representations exist, but not in the 10 × 10 benchmark policy
19
The implications of heterogeneous expectations in the context of the New Keyen-
sian monetary model is examined in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2002). This issue is further
discussed in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a)
20
As noted earlier, in case of very low γ, unstable determinacy and explosive steady
states are present.
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space: α
x
> 12 yields stable sunspots).
Consider Figure 4, showing the regions of stability of CF representations
for the Woodford calibration with γ = 1.21
Figures 4, 5 Here
For this calibration stable CF sunspots appear for large regions of plausible
policy parameters. For the Woodford calibration, the results are almost as
dramatic for the case γ = 0.5, as can be seen in Figure 5. Recall that when
we set γ = 1 we also set β = 0.99 in line with W, CGG and MN, whereas for
the case γ = 0.5 we set β = 1, as in (Fuhrer and Moore 1995). The existence
of stable CF sunspots does not depend on the choice of β, but the precise
region is sensitive to this choice for PR
3
: for β < 1 (and either value of γ)
the region of stable CF sunspots includes regions of part of the passive policy
region α
π
< 1.
We now relate these results to those found elsewhere in the literature.
(Bullard and Mitra 2002) studied this model with γ = 1, and showed that
all determinate equilibria were stable under learning. Our ﬁndings indicate
that this result extends to models that include lagged inﬂation in the AS
curve. Bullard and Mitra also found that for indeterminate steady-states the
MSV solution22 may be stable, and pointed out that whether agents could
learn sunspots in this case was an open question. Clearly the answer to this
question is a resounding yes. In particular, common factor representations
can be thought of as MSV representations together with serially correlated
sunspots, and we have found that these sunspots may be stable.
(Honkapohja andMitra 2001) studied this model, with γ = 1, and demon-
strated that ﬁnite state “resonance frequency” sunspots exist and are stable
for a region of the parameter space. These solutions take the form
y
t
= cgˆ
t
+ ds
t
where s
t
is a K × 1 vector representing a K-state Markov process with
transition probabilities that satisfy particular conditions sometimes called
“resonant frequency conditions.” This result is consistent with and, in fact,
suggestive of ours.
21
In Figures 4 and 5, unmarked lattice points indicate order two indeterminacy.
22
By MSV solution is meant a solution that depends on a minimal number of state
variables. For a discussion see (McCallum 1983) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
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In (Evans and McGough 2002b) we show that there is an intimate link
between CF representations and ﬁnite-state sunspots in univariate models.
For the current model with γ = 1 our solutions (14) satisfy b = 0 and thus
take the form
y
t
= cgˆ
t
+ dζ
t
,
where, in the case of order-one indeterminacy, ζ
t
is an AR(1) process ζ
t
=
λ
i
ζ
t−1
+ ε˘
t
.23 Particular choices of the mds ε˘
t
yield solutions of the form
y
t
= cgˆ
t
+ ds
t
with the required transition probabilities. When 0 < γ < 1
our CF solutions take the form
y
t
= by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
+ dζ
t
,
where now b = 0. The condition that the AR(1) coeﬃcient is λ
i
, for i = 2, 3,
i.e. equal to a critical eigenvalue, is the resonant frequency condition for
CF solutions. Our PR
3
result can thus be thought of as a generalization of
the Honkapohja-Mitra ﬁnding: we extend the economic model to the case
γ < 1, in which the model has backward looking components, and we exhibit
and study the more general representations taking the form of CF sunspot
solutions.
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003d) studied optimal discretionary policy in
the model (1)-(2), with γ = 1, and advise an interest rate designed specif-
ically to oﬀset any destabilizing forward looking behavior of agents. Their
recommended interest rate rule takes the form
i
t
= δ
π
E∗
t
π
t+1
+ δ
x
E∗
t
x
t+1
+ δ
gˆ
gˆ
t
,
where δ
π
= 1 + λβφ−1(α+ λ2)−1, δ
x
= φ−1, δ
gˆ
=
(
φ−1, λφ−1(α + λ2)−1
)
and
α ≥ 0 parameterizes the weight placed by the policy maker on output relative
to inﬂation volatility. Note that optimal policy requires a dependence on gˆ
t
as well as on inﬂation and output forecasts, but the presence of this term does
not aﬀect determinacy or stability.24 (Evans and Honkapohja 2003d) show
that this rule is invariably determinate and that the REE is always E-stable
and hence stable under least squares learning. This rule is recommended in
23
If ε˘
t
is white noise then ζ
t
is a stationary AR(1) process since |λ
i
| < 1. For general
mds ε˘
t
the process ζ
t
need not be stationary, but ζ
t
will be nonexplosive in conditional
mean (and ζ
t
can be expressed as an absolutely summable inﬁnite moving average process
in ε˘
t−s
).
24
In the reduced form, only the coeﬃcient C of gˆ
t
is aﬀected. This does not aﬀect the
E-stability conditions or the conditions for determinacy, as can be seen from the Appendix.
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preference to other interest rate policies, such as fundamentals based rules
depending only on gˆ
t
, which they show to be unstable under learning even
though they are consistent with the REE corresponding to optimal discre-
tionary policy.
The size of the stable determinacy region surrounding this policy depends
on the structural parameters. We investigated this point by analyzing nine
lattices over the square (0, 10)×(0, 10) in policy space (α
π
, α
x
) corresponding
to all permutations of λ ∈ {.024, .3, 1} and φ ∈ {.164, 1, 1/.157}, with γ = 1.
In each case there are qualitatively similar regions: stable determinacy (Fig-
ure 4, region A) lies at least part way along the horizontal axis for α
π
> 1
and is bounded above by a downward sloping line, unstable indeterminacy
(Figure 4, region B) lies at least part way along the vertical axis for α
π
< 1
and is bounded on the right by a downward sloping line. The area of stable
CF sunspots (Figure 4, region C) is the region that remains. However, quan-
titatively we ﬁnd the following: ﬁrst, for ﬁxed λ, as φ gets smaller, the region
of stable indeterminacy shifts up, replaced by stable determinacy, and the
region of unstable indeterminacy appears unaﬀected; second, for ﬁxed φ, as λ
gets smaller, the region of stable indeterminacy shifts up slightly, replaced by
stable determinacy, and again, the region of unstable indeterminacy appears
unaﬀected.25
The existence of stable sunspots in part of the parameter space pro-
vides an important caveat to following the advice of (Evans and Honkapohja
2003d). Policy makers may think the economy is in a determinate and stable
region of its parameter space and thus that agents will learn the intended
equilibrium; however, if policy makers are wrong about the values of the key
parameters λ and φ, agents may instead coordinate on an inferior sunspot
equilibrium.
Stability and determinacy respect small continuous movements in para-
meter values, and thus for any particular calibration, the Evans-Honkapohja
rule will work well locally. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003d) also show that
25
In the case γ = 1 analytic stability results are possible. We ﬁnd that provided
α
x
 = 1/φ then necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of stable sunspots are
given by
λ (α
π
− 1) + α
x
(1− β) > 0
λ (α
π
− 1) + α
x
(1 + β) > 2(1 + β)/φ.
These are precisely the same restrictions obtained by (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) for
noisy ﬁnite-state Markov sunspot solutions.
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the system under learning remains locally stable even when policy makers
are simultaneously updating estimates λ and φ.26 However, numerical re-
sults suggest that the margin for error available to policy makers when at-
tempting to follow the Evans-Honkapohja rule, can depend critically on the
structural parameters. As an extreme, but perhaps not implausible example,
we obtained results for λ = 1, φ = 6.3694, and γ = 1. The value φ is the
one used in the W calibration, and λ = 1 is within the range of estimates
from the literature mentioned on p. 170, footnote 32, in (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 2000).
Figure 6 Here
In Figure 6 we see that a triangle of stable determinacy exists, but it is
bordered by unstable indeterminacy on the left, and, even more ominously,
by stable indeterminacy on the right. We conclude that in some cases learn-
able sunspots abound in regions not far from those corresponding to optimal
policy. Our ﬁndings also import a more general warning: simply following a
Taylor rule with aggressive response to expected inﬂation is not necessarily
stabilizing for the economy. This warning is emphasized for the parame-
ter values used in Figure 6. Note that even for α
x
= 0, stable sunspots
exist if α
π
> 1.7. In contrast, if the CGG values are correct then the Evans-
Honkapohja rule is quite robust.
3.4 Policy Rule 4
PR
4
is given by
PR
4
: i
t
= θi
t−1
+ (1− θ)α
π
E∗
t
π
t+1
+ (1− θ)α
x
x
t
,
where θ > 0. This policy rule is of particular interest in part because it is
the form of the rule speciﬁcally considered in part IV of (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 2000). Furthermore, the issue of inertia in policy rules, captured by
θ > 0, has been discussed extensively in the literature. (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 2000) use the value θ = 0.68 based on (quarterly) estimates from the
pre-Volker period, but there is no agreement that this is an appropriate value.
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That is, locally there is asymptotic convergence both of structural parameter estimates
to their true values λ, φ and forecasts E
∗
t
x
t+1
, E
∗
t
π
t+1
to their RE values. Hence locally
the economy converges to the REE corresponding to optimal discretionary policy.
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On the one hand (Rudebusch 2002) argues that the usual empirical evidence
for monetary policy inertia may well be illusory and that the true value of θ
may be zero or small. On the other hand (Rotemberg and Woodford 1999)
have argued that θ > 1 with α
π
> 0 may be close to optimal. Interest rate
rules with θ > 1 are often called “superinertial.”
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001) analyzed PR
4
numerically, for γ = 1, and
found that for the CGG calibration of λ and φ and with their estimated values
of α
x
, α
π
and θ for the pre-Volker era, the sunspot solutions that we call
general form representations were unstable under learning. We conﬁrm this
result and we ﬁnd also that although CF-sunspot solutions do exist, they are
not stable under learning. Figure 7 shows the results for the CGG calibration
of λ and φ with θ = 0.68: in the 10 × 10 policy grid for (α
x
, α
π
), there
are no stable CF sunspots, while all determinate steady states are learnable.
Furthermore, these results are robust both to the inclusion of lagged inﬂation
in the AS curve, 0 < γ < 1, and to the magnitude of 0 < θ < 1.
Figure 7 Here
However, as with PR
3
, we ﬁnd that there are many cases in which stable
CF sunspots exist, and the location of this region in policy space is very
sensitive to the values of structural parameters assumed. Even with the CGG
calibration for λ and φ and with θ = 0.68, there exist stable CF sunspots for
suﬃciently large values of α
π
. Furthermore, for other values of λ and φ we
ﬁnd that the possibility of stable CF sunspots needs to be taken seriously.
For example, for the values φ = 1/.157 and λ = 1 examined earlier, stable CF
sunspots exist for passive responses to output gap, and aggressive responses
to inﬂation; further, as θ gets small, the response to inﬂation required for
stability becomes reasonably valued: see Figure 8 in which we set θ = 0.1.
A very similar ﬁgure is obtained in case γ = .5; in particular, the presence
of inﬂation inertia in the AS curve does not preclude stable CF sunspots at
reasonable parameter values.
Figure 8 Here
Because the region of stable indeterminacy depends on the structural pa-
rameters φ and λ, as well as the interest rate smoothing term θ, we again
test the robustness of our results to alternative calibrations. We analyzed
27 lattices over the square (0, 10) × (0, 10) in policy space (α
π
, α
x
) corre-
sponding to all permutations of λ ∈ {.024, .3, 1}, φ ∈ {.164, 1, 1/.157}, and
28
θ ∈ {.05, .5, .9}. For this exercise we set γ = 1. In general, there are two re-
gions of indeterminacy: an unstable region along the vertical axis for α
π
< 1:
see Figure 8, Region B; and a triangular region of stable CF sunspots in the
southeast corner: see Figure 8, Region C; the remaining region corresponds
to stable determinacy: see Figure 8, Region A. We ﬁnd that as φ and λ
get smaller, and as θ gets larger, the region of stable indeterminacy shifts
to the right, replaced by stable determinacy. The unstable region appears
unaﬀected.
One conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that while stable sunspots
do exist under PR
4
for suﬃciently aggressive responses to expected inﬂation,
the policy maker may hedge against the danger, which depends on the true
values of λ and φ, by setting the smoothing term 0 < θ < 1 to be fairly
high.27
Finally, it is of interest to examine the case of superinertial rules with
θ > 1. To remain consistent with the superinertial rules already in the
literature, we modify PR
4
so as to ensure that the coeﬃcients on expected
inﬂation and current output gap are positive:
PR′
4
: i
t
= θi
t−1
+ χ
π
E∗
t
π
t+1
+ χ
x
x
t
.
We examined equilibria corresponding to a 10×10 lattice over (χ
π
, χ
x
) policy
space, and for θ = 1.1 and 2, and γ = 1 and .5. For the W, CGG, and MN
calibrations, this rule performed well; for all permutations of θ and γ and over
the entire benchmark lattice the corresponding steady states were stable and
determinate. However, stable indeterminacy was found for the alternative
calibration φ = 1/.157, and λ = 1: see Figure 9. The existence of these
stable sunspots is robust to the permutations of θ and γ.
Figure 9 Here
3.5 Discussion
Sunspot equilibria are stable under learning only for Taylor-type policy rules
that depend on forecasts of future inﬂation, and only for certain solution
representations that we call “common factor” representations. However, for
27
(Bullard and Mitra 2003) consider in detail the impact of interest rate inertia on
determinacy and stability of MSV solutions, and reach the same conclusion.
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such forward looking rules stable CF sunspots are abundant. The location of
the region of stable sunspot solutions depends on the structural parameters φ
and λ in the IS and AS curves. When these parameters are large, the region
of stable CF sunspots, in the policy parameter space, includes realistic values
for feedback coeﬃcients in the interest rate rule. In particular, following the
Taylor principle α
π
> 1 is not suﬃcient to avoid stable CF sunspots, even if
the output feedback α
x
is small. Given uncertainty about the true values for
φ and λ, the possibility of stable sunspots appears to be of genuine concern,
and the possibility, in the indeterminate case, of all solutions being unstable
is equally troubling.
Stable CF sunspot solutions can arise even if there are backward looking
components to inﬂation and even if there is inertia (interest rate smooth-
ing) in the monetary policy rule. This possibility had not been previously
recognized in the literature. Interest rate inertia does, however, increase the
region of stable determinacy relative to the benchmark policy square.
In general, inertia, or backward looking behavior, might be expected to
reduce the risk of indeterminacy (i.e. reduce the proportion of the benchmark
parameter space corresponding to indeterminate steady states). While we
have demonstrated that inertial components in the AS curve and policy rule
do not overturn our main results, it is possible that inertia in the IS curve
— speciﬁcally, a dependence on lagged output gap, justiﬁed, say, by habit
formation — may have an important impact. Investigation of this issue will
receive a high priority in our future research.28
Our study of interest rate inertia focussed on interest rate rule PR
4
. It
would also be useful to investigate the inﬂuence on the regions of determinacy
and stability of an interest rate smoothing term in rules PR
1
— PR
3
. We
restricted attention to the speciﬁcation of these rules without the inertial
term for expedience. However our preliminary investigations indicate that
while the location and relative size of the regions of determinacy and stability
are altered somewhat, the presence of interest rate inertia in policy rules PR
1
— PR
3
does not, in general, change our central results. This is also an issue
that we intend to investigate more thoroughly in future work.
28
In principle, stability under learning can be investigated using large scale macro-
econometric models; see, for example, (Garratt and Hall 1997). Our techniques could be
extended to study the stability of CF sunspot solutions in such models as well as to a
larger class of policy rules.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the question of whether macroeconomic ﬂuctua-
tions, taking the form of coordination on extraneous exogenous variables,
are likely to emerge under adaptive learning when the economy is character-
ized by New Keynesian IS-AS equations and monetary policy follows a form
of Taylor rule. Both purely forward-looking and hybrid, partly backward-
looking inﬂation equations were examined. We have emphasized that the
possibility of “sunspot equilibria” that are stable under adaptive learning
depends critically on the representation of the solution, i.e. on the econo-
metric speciﬁcation used by agents when they estimate and update their
forecasting model.
In many cases stationary sunspot equilibria can be represented either as
“general form” VARs, driven by serially uncorrelated sunspots, or as “com-
mon factor” sunspot solutions, in which the extraneous sunspot variables
are autoregressive processes with resonant frequency coeﬃcients. Common
factor sunspots generalize ﬁnite state Markov sunspots, which were an early
focus in the sunspot literature and which have recently been shown to yield
the possibility of stable sunspots in purely forward looking linear models.
In the New Keynesian model, we ﬁnd that common factor sunspots can in-
deed be stable under learning, in many cases, even though the general form
solutions with serially uncorrelated sunspots are not.
In particular, Taylor-type interest rate rules that depend on forecasts of
future inﬂation can generate stable common factor sunspot solutions, and
this risk is particularly high when there are strong IS and AS eﬀects. This
possibility arises even if the AS equation includes backward looking com-
ponents and the interest rate rule includes inertia. This result is deeply
troubling since monetary policy is often viewed as forward looking. If the
structural model and its key parameters are known, or can be estimated fairly
precisely, then an appropriately designed forward looking policy can deliver
a stable determinate equilibrium (indeed an optimal stable equilibrium) and
the sunspot problem will not arise. However, for some structural parameters
the margin of error is small and the impact of an error is great. In contrast,
policy rules depending on forecasts of current output and inﬂation do not
appear to be subject to these diﬃculties.
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Appendix
To illustrate the details of the technique we focus on the policy rule PR
1
given by (3). In this case
H =


1 + φα
x
φα
π
0 −1 0
−λ 1 β(γ − 1) 0 −1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 ρ
g
0
0 0 0 0 ρ
u

 and F =


1 φ 0 0 0
0 βγ 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


Order one indeterminacy. This occurs when |λ
1
| > 1 and the re-
maining eigenvalues have norm less than one. Notice this implies λ
1
is real;
however λ
i
for i > 1 may be complex. For reasons discussed above, in the in-
determinate case, we only consider real eigenvalues. To obtain a nonexplosive
solution, we require z
1t
= 0, and ε˜
1t
+ w˜
1t
= 0.
General Form Representations: A general form representation is the
usual recursive system describing the equilibrium and is characterized by a
sunspot that forms a martingale diﬀerence sequence. Fix i = 2 or 3. We may
then use the nonexplosiveness condition z
1t
= 0 together with the equation
z
it
= λ
i
z
it−1
+ w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
to obtain the following representation.
y
t
= (S11
i
)−1
(
0 −S13
λ
i
Si1 λ
i
Si2 − Si3
)
y
t−1
+ (S11
i
)−1
(
0 0
0 λ
i
Si3
)
y
t−2
−(S11
i
)−1S14
i
gˆ
t
+ (S11
i
)−1
(
0 0
λ
i
Si4 λ
i
Si5
)
gˆ
t−1
+(S11
i
)−1
(
0
1
)
w˜
it
+ (S11
i
)−1
(
0
1
)
ε˜
it
.
The identities
w˜
it
=
(
(FS)i4, (FS)i5
)
w
t
ξ˜
it
=
(
Si1, Si2
)
ε
t
w
t
= gˆ
t
− ρgˆ
t−1
may be used to place this representation in the form given in the text.
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Common Factor Representations: Again assume |λ
1
| > 1 and the remain-
ing eigenvalues have norm less than one. Let ε
t
be a mds with ε˜
1t
+ w˜
1t
= 0.
Pick i = 2 or 3. The REE associated to ε
t
must satisfy the equation
z
it
= λ
i
z
it−1
+ w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
,
or
z
it
= (1− λ
i
L)−1(w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
).
We interpret the noise term on the right to be a sunspot ζ
t
and thus write
z
it
= ζ
t
with
ζ
t
= λ
i
ζ
t−1
+ w˜
it
+ ε˜
it
.
Combining this with the restriction z
1t
= 0 yields two common factor repre-
sentations of the form
y
t
= −(S11
i
)−1
(
0 S13
0 Si3
)
y
t−1
− (S11
i
)−1S14
i
gˆ
t
+ (S11
i
)−1
(
0
1
)
ζ
t
.
Order two indeterminacy.
General Form Representations: Now all eigenvalues are in the unit circle
and thus there is no concern over the nonexplosiveness restriction. Pick real
eigenvalues λ
i
, and λ
j
. We can write
(
z
it
z
jt
)
= (λ
i
⊕ λ
j
)
(
z
it−1
z
jt−1
)
+
(
w˜
it
w˜
jt
)
+
(
ε˜
it
ε˜
jt
)
.
This can be rearranged to yield the following representation:
y
t
= (Si1
j
)−1
(
λ
i
Si1 λ
i
Si2 − Si3
λ
j
Sj1 λ
j
Sj2 − Sj3
)
y
t−1
+ (Si1
j
)−1
(
0 λ
i
Si3
0 λ
j
Sj3
)
y
t−2
−(Si1
j
)−1Si4
j
gˆ
t
+ (Si1
j
)−1
(
λ
i
Si4 λ
i
Si5
λ
j
Sj4 λ
j
Sj5
)
gˆ
t−1
+(Si1
j
)−1
(
w˜
it
w˜
jt
)
+ (Si1
j
)−1
(
ε˜
it
ε˜
jt
)
.
Common Factor Representations: Again, pick real eigenvalues λ
i
, and λ
j
.
Then we may deﬁne the VAR sunspot
ζ
t
= (λ
i
⊕ λ
j
)ζ
t−1
+
(
w˜
it
w˜
jt
)
+
(
ε˜
it
ε˜
jt
)
.
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The resulting CF representation has the form
y
t
= −(Si1
j
)−1
(
0 Si3
0 Sj3
)
y
t−1
− (Si1
j
)−1Si4
j
gˆ
t
+ (Si1
j
)−1ζ
t
.
Learning. For PR
1
the reduced form is(
x
t
π
t
)
= AE
t
(
x
t+1
π
t+1
)
+B
(
x
t−1
π
t−1
)
+ C
(
g
t
u
t
)
,
where
A =
(
δ φ(1− α
π
βγ)δ
λδ βγ + λφ(1− α
π
βγ)δ
)
B =
(
0 −φα
π
β(1− γ)δ
0 β(1− γ)− λφα
π
β(1− γ)δ
)
C =
(
δ −φα
π
δ
λδ 1− λφα
π
δ
)
,
and δ = (1 + φ(α
x
+ λα
π
))−1.
For PR′
1
the reduced form is(
x
t
π
t
)
= AE∗
t
(
x
t+1
π
t+1
)
+B
(
x
t−1
π
t−1
)
+ C
(
g
t
u
t
)
+DE∗
t
(
x
t
π
t
)
where
A =
(
1 φ
λ βγ + λφ
)
B =
(
0 0
0 β(1− γ)
)
C =
(
1 0
λ 1
)
D =
(
−φα
x
−φα
π
−λφα
x
−λφα
π
)
For all of our policy rules the CF-PLM is given by
y
t
= a+ by
t−1
+ cgˆ
t
+ dζ
t
ζ
t
= λ
i
ζ
t−1
+ ε˘
t
.
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The associated T-map is
a → (A(I
2
+ b) +D)a
b → Ab2 +Db+B
c → A(bc+ cρ) +Dc+ C
d → A(bd+ dλ
i
) +Dd
The relevant Jacobians are given by
DT
a
= A(I
2
+ b) +D
DT
b
= b′ ⊗ A+ I
2
⊗Ab+ I
2
⊗D
DT
c
= I
2
⊗Ab+ ρ′ ⊗ A+ I
2
⊗D
DT
d
= Ab+ λ
i
⊗ A+D.
The E-stability conditions are that the real part is less than 1 for every eigen-
value of DT
i
, i = a, b, c, d. The general form case can be handled similarly.
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Figure 1: Policy Rule 1, Woodford Calibration, γ=1
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Figure 2: Policy Rule 1, CGG Calibration, γ = 1/2, β = 1
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Figure 3: Policy Rule 2, CGG Calibration, γ = 1/2, β = 1
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Figure 4: Policy Rule 3, Woodford Calibration, γ = 1 
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Figure 5: Policy Rule 3, Woodford Calibration, γ=1/2, β=1 
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Figure 6: Policy Rule 3, λ=1, φ=1/.157, γ=1
 α
π
α
x

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 8: Policy Rule 4, φ=1/.157, λ=1, θ =.1, γ=1
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Figure 9: Policy Rule 4', φ = 6.3694, λ = 1, θ = 2,  γ = 1
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